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Government regulation stems from market failure. However, it is not always effective for 
regulation. Excessive regulation or lack of regulation would lead to inefficient regulation, thus 
the regulatory objectives can not be achieved. External intervention of regulation on 
enterprise internal control aims to protect the public interests, but it is obviously impossible 
that only expecting to implement regulation through a single “rule of law” to achieve the goal 
of the effectiveness of internal control. These may lead to one-sided pursuit to formally 
comply with internal control regulation, while ignoring the real purpose of the "internal 
control effectiveness". As a result, resources would be wasted and the efficiency of resources 
allocation would be reduced. This paper takes the relevant rules of internal control issued by 
the Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulators as institutional background, takes the 
economics of regulation as the theoretical basis, takes the shortcomings of the existing 
internal control and regulatory literature as an research opportunity, takes listed companies of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006-2011 as samples, theoretically analyzes and empirically 
tests the effectiveness of implementation of internal control regulatory rules in China. This 
research focus to answer the practical question that the internal control regulatory rules lead 
to “formal compliance” or “substantial effectiveness”, and aim to help us to fully understand 
and improve the effectiveness internal control regulation. By researching, we achieve the 
following conclusions. 
Firstly, from the economic theory, the failure of corporate internal control can not 
fundamentally be solved if only depends on the external regulation. Compliance costs, which 
were engendered by additional regulation, may cause managers to make decision to formally 
comply with rules. The empirical results show that the additional costs increased significantly 
when following the internal control regulatory rules, but the raised costs have not been taken 
according to the quality of internal control. So we can infer that the real purpose of 
compliance cost is to achieve the ‘formal compliance’. 
Secondly, the implementation of internal control regulatory rules is by forcing to disclose 
the internal control information. If the regulation is effectiveness, then this type of 
information disclosed should play the function of signaling. The empirical evidence shows 
that the disclosure of internal control information is not yet play a signaling function. The 
reason is that information asymmetry exists between two parties of player in the regulation. If 
lack of appropriate supporting mechanisms, the regulation may lead to deviate from the initial 
objectives, and ultimately only achieve the purpose of ‘formal compliance’. 
Thirdly, the important innovations of internal control guidelines system in our country is 
the comprehensive internal control. But in the implementation process, the there are different 
cognition between Ministry of Finance and the securities regulatory authorities. The results of 
this paper show that the disclosure of internal control information could play an early warning 
role for the restatement of financial statements to some extent, but can not signal the 
effectiveness of enterprise comprehensive internal control. 














paper directly and comprehensively examines the effectiveness of the implementation of 
internal control regulation from two views including corporate compliance cost and signaling 
function. The results conclude that the enterprises, complying with the internal control 
regulatory rules, may take aim to ‘formal compliance’, which help us to understand of the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the internal control regulatory rules by providing 
additional empirical evidence. In addition, this study enriches the literature of internal control 
regulation in emerging market, compliance costs for internal control regulation, and internal 
control discolure based on signaling theory. 
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年发布了《反海外贿赂法案（Foreign Corrupt Practices Act，简称 FCPA）》、1991
年颁布了《联邦存款保险公司改进法案（Federal Depository Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act，简称 FDICIA）》以及 2002 年推出了《公众公司会计改革与投
资者保护法案（Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002，简称“萨班斯·奥克斯利法案”，Sarbanes-Oxley Act 或 SOX 法案）》，这
些法规对全球资本市场的内部控制监管产生了深远影响。然而监管实施绝非一帆
风顺，监管效果也喜忧参半，尤其是 SOX 法案第 404 条款的执行引发了实务界
的诸多争议，学术界对此问题的研究文献亦汗牛充栋，结论褒贬不一。Hart（2009）
甚至认为 SOX 法案的通过明显是为了回应关键事件、满足政治需要的结果。突
                                                        
① 罗斯·弗里德曼. 自由选择[M]. 北京：商务印书馆. 1998: 16. 
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第二节  基本概念范围界定 
一、内部控制的定义 
关于“内部控制”一词，首次出现在美国会计师协会（American Institute of 
Accountants，简称 AIA）①于 1936 年发布的一份题为“独立公共会计师实施财务
报 表 检 查 （ Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public 
Accountants）”的报告之中，此后该协会下设的审计程序委员会（Committee on 
Auditing Procedure，简称 CAP）在其 1949 年发布的“内部控制：协调系统的要
素及其对管理层和独立会计师的重要性（ Internal Control：Elements of a 
















义。根据美国证券监督管理委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission，简称
SEC）于 2003 年 6 月发布的“ 终规则：证券交易法规定的定期报告中披露财
务报告内部控制的管理层报告和鉴证报告（Final Rule: Management’s Reports on 
                                                        















Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in 























的。1991 年美国国会通过的 FDICIA 法案第 112 条规定“总资产超过 5 亿美元的
银行必须向联邦存款保险公司及其联邦主管机关提交一份管理层报告
（Management Report），该报告中须包含：一份管理层的责任声明，明确表示其




















是保护公共利益和维护金融系统的稳定。2002 年由参议院银行委员会主席 Paul 
Sarbanes 和众议院金融服务委员会主席 Mike Oxley 联合提出，并 终经时任美





















                                                        
① 考虑到各类文献中已对 SOX 法案进行过详细的介绍和解释，本文此处不再详细赘述。 
② 原文为“To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to 
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